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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BLACK MARKET EXCHANGE RATE
IN IRAN

ABBAS VALADKHANI

Queensland University of Technology
ABSTRACT The Iranian rial has been depreciated on average about 13 per cent per
annum against the U.S dollar during the last four decades. This paper examines the
long- and short-run determinants of the black market exchange rate employing the
cointegration techniques and the annual time series data from 1960 to 2002. Consistent
with previous studies and the monetary approach to the exchange-rate determination, it
is found that the black market exchange rate is cointegrated with the relative consumer
price indices in Iran and the U.S., real GDP and the relative import prices. However, in
the short run only the rising relative prices and a meagre real GDP growth have been
responsible for the depreciation of Iranian currency.
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1. Introduction
A volatile and constantly depreciating exchange rate can adversely affect a number of key
macroeconomic variables such as private investment, GDP growth, and the demand for
money. In fact, the black market exchange rate in Iran can be considered as a proxy
measure of general public confidence to the performance of economy (Valadkhani, 2003).
This market forms a very important Iranian institution that operates in specific streets of
Tehran and other large cities and in varied shops! One set of actors in this market may be
overseas visitors, Iranians returning from trips abroad, Iranians now resident in other
countries and visiting family and friends, etc. who have various quantities of a most
valuable commodity, viz. other countries' currencies. Another set of actors comprise what
can be termed "the real buyers" of these scarce commodities. This set includes
businesspersons involved in international trade, particularly importers, Iranians about to
travel overseas for any purposes, e.g. business trips, the provision of medical services,
visiting relatives resident abroad, etc.
However, these "real buyers" will not physically undertake transactions with
suppliers of other currencies on the streets. This market is characterised by middlepersons
or agents, who close the link between buyers and sellers. These agents will be typically
unemployed or underemployed Iranians who may well be frontpersons for wealthy
opportunistic entrepreneurs who have recognised that a government policy for the price of
other countries' currencies is a non-market clearing price. As the difference between the
market price and the government-determined price for these commodities increased in
1995, a third set of actors, the police, entered the stage!
In both the pre- and post-revolution periods, Iran has operated a fixed exchange
rate regime, albeit with periodic devaluations. Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the
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official exchange rate between the rial and the US$ was approximately 70 rials per dollar.
At that time, the gap between the official and the black market exchange rate was about 7
rials. However, the gap between the black market and the official rate has widened through
time.
It is very interesting to note that since 1989 a new source of government revenue
originated from the sale of foreign currencies. The exchange rate was devalued by
approximately 25 per cent over the 1989-1992 period, but in spite of such a devaluation,
the black market for foreign currencies persisted. The government's exchange rate policy
had the effect of making the government a beneficiary of its own policy. The gap between
the black market and the official rates has rendered a windfall gain for both the
government and some foreign currency dealers in the parallel market. For this reason, it is
apparent that the substantial segment of "other revenue" in the government annual budget
is attributable to the sale of foreign currencies by the Central Bank in the black market.
The share of "other revenue" in the government budget increased from an average of 14
per cent in the revolutionary and war period (1978-1988) to 36.2 per cent in the four years
following the end of the Iraqi war (i.e. 1989-1992). It should be noted that the Central
Bank started its direct intervention in the black market in 1988 (Valadkhani, 1997).
Overestimation of government revenue and/or underestimation of expenditure,
placed the Iranian government in a critical situation during the revolutionary and war
period (1978-1988). On average the ratio of the budget deficit to total government
expenditure trebled in this period compared to that of the oil boom period (1973-1977). In
1989 the budget deficit was so large as to represent an unprecedented rate of 51 per cent of
total expenditure. This ratio was reduced to 6.7 per cent in 1993 (Nourbakhsh, 1993). It
seems that the sale of foreign currencies by the Central Bank in the black market played a
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major role in this achievement!
It should also be mentioned that the black market for foreign currencies is linked
very closely with the government's policies. In the 1980s the government experienced a
substantial budget deficit and, as a result, government indebtedness to the Central Bank
increased substantially. Under these circumstances soaring inflation was inevitable. This,
in turn, amplified the gap between the official rate and the black market exchange rate for
foreign currencies. For example, the gap between the official and black market exchange
rates increased from an average of 175 rials per US dollar in the early 1980s to 1400 rials
in 1989 (Valadkhani, 1997).
Because of this increasing gap between the official rate and the black market rate,
the government devalued the rial to 1750 per US dollar in an attempt to restore an
equilibrium in the foreign exchange market and foster non-oil exports. Notwithstanding
the fact that Iran used a multiple-exchange-rate system in the allocation of scarce hard
currency earnings, this system was not successful. According to Farzin (1995) at one time
during the war the number of exchange rates applicable to various categories of imports
and exports exceeded seven.
The main reason for the deterioration in the value of the rial is the monetisation of
the enormous budget deficit during and after the war. It should be mentioned that, to some
extent, psychological and socio-political factors have also played an undeniable role. The
growing gap between the government official and black market exchange rates directed
scarce resources to unproductive sectors. The profitability of the trade sector, particularly
small-scale trade such as sidewalk and small vendors, stimulated rent-seeking activities at
the expense of goods-producing sectors. The currency devaluation policies also coerced
economic agents, particularly the government and semi-government enterprises, into
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having an enormous demand for money (Bahmani-Oskooee, 1996). In other words, while
the purchasing power of the rial decreases, people, including the government and semigovernment enterprises, demand more money to cover their transactions. It is also argued
that the income elasticity of the demand for money has decreased since the 1979
revolution. This means "the same rate of expansion in private sector liquidity is likely to
have more inflationary consequences after than before the revolution" (Pesaran, 1995,
p.5). This decline in income elasticity is also a manifestation of an inefficient banking
system.
Bahmani-Oskooee (1995a, p. 278) points out that in 1993 the black market
exchange rate was 2400 rials to the US$, involving a 30-fold depreciation of the rial. In
March 1993 the Iranian government embarked upon the exchange rate unification policy
with consultation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The major objective of this
recent policy was to unify the multiple exchange rate regime into a single equilibrium rate
by the massive intervention of the Iranian Central Bank. However, this policy has not been
successful on various grounds, viz. the lack of an appropriate government social safety net
to support vulnerable strata, the incorrect initial exchange rate announced by the Central
Bank, and the unsuitable timing of the unification. See Farzin (1995) for a detailed
explanation of these reasons and the recent assessment of the foreign exchange reform in
Iran.
Therefore, in late 1995 the Iranian authorities once again decided to administer, or
implement, the existing regulations relating to the fixed exchange rate system and
"cracked down" on the participants in the black market. The Iranian police, with powers to
arrest both buyers and sellers, began to be active in trying to prevent transactions in this
market. According to the Central Bank of Iran (2003) black market exchange rate was
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approximately 8314 rials to the US$ in 2003. More recently, the Banking system buys and
sells foreign currencies from individuals at a rate marginally below the black market rate.
Abstracting from political and social effects associated with this black market, the
important question in this study is to determine the economic factors, which give rise to
the prices in the black market for foreign currencies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 a theoretical model is
postulated, which captures the long-run equation for the black market exchange rate using
both the Johansen multivariate cointegration technique and the Engle-Granger
representation theorem. Sources of the annual data employed as well as the unit-root
results using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Kwiatskowski-PhillipsSchmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests are discussed in Section 3. This section also presents the
empirical econometric results for the long- and short-run determinants of the black market
exchange rate, as well as policy implications of the study. Section 4 provides some
concluding remarks.

2. The Model
Bahmani-Oskooee (1995a and 1995b) has made an important empirical contribution by
applying cointegration techniques in his econometric analysis of those factors that
determine the black market exchange rate. According to his empirical results, not only the
consumer price index is cointegrated with the nominal stock of money, real GDP, the
black market exchange rate, and the world export price index (as a proxy for import
prices), but also the black market exchange rate has a long-run relationship with the
consumer price index, the nominal stock of money, the real GDP, and the world export
price index. Bahmani-Oskooee's policy conclusion is that the black market exchange rate
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cannot be stabilised unless the Iranian government seriously curbs inflation. Consistent
with the monetary approach to the exchange-rate determination approach, this conclusion
is also supported by Figure 1, which shows the time series data on the relative consumer
price indices in Iran (P) and the U.S. (P*) and the black market exchange rate (BE) for the
US dollar during the period 1960-2003. It seems that there exists a vicious cycle in which
a high relative inflation devalues the rial and a negligibly valued rial aggravates inflation.
There are some empirical studies which have elucidated this cycle, for example Dadkhah
(1987) and Bahmani-Oskooee (1993).
[Figure 1 about here]
The central institutional mechanism which enables this trend to continue is the
lack of independence of the Iranian Central Bank. According to Bahmani-Oskooee the
independence of the Central Bank is a crucial institutional reform. In his analysis of the
black market exchange rate, Pesaran (1992) also emphasises the interaction of inflation
and the rates of inflation in Iran’s major trading partners (measured by bilateral and
multilateral real exchange rate indices). He shows that when Iranian prices increase more
than do those of her trading partners, the black market exchange rate rises. Similar results
have also obtained in the present study. Pesaran’s analysis, as does that of BahmaniOskooee (1995b), points to the crucial factor of Iran's persistent inflation as one of the
determinants of the rising price (in Iranian rials) for major international currencies. In this
study the long-run equation for the black market exchange rate is specified as follows:
ln( BEt ) = β 0 + β1 ln( Pt / Pt* ) + β 2 ln(Yt ) + β 3 ln( Pmt / Pmt* ) + et

(1)

where BE is the black market exchange rate (the price of $US in Iranian rial); P and P*
denote the consumer price index (1982=1) in Iran and the U.S, respectively, the Y is Iran’s
real GDP (1982 prices); and Pm and P*m are the corresponding import price indices in Iran
6

and the U.S (1990=1). For a concise review of the literature on black market exchange
rates see Siddiki (2000).
It is important to note that this specification assumes that the impact of the nominal
stock of money, as proposed by Bahmani-Oskooee (1995b), is captured by the consumer
price index. It is expected that the Iranian currency can appreciate (BE declines in
magnitude) as prices in Iran increase less than prices in the U.S, as GDP grows, and as the
U.S import price index rises less than that of Iran. Therefore, it can be hypothesised that if
GDP growth in Iran is negative or negligible and if price rises are higher than those in the
U.S economy, then the price of dollar, in rials, will rise. Based on these theoretical
postulations, it is then expected that β1>0 and both β2 and β3<0.
In order to have a valid model for the black market exchange rate, there should be
at least one cointegrating vector in the system. The Johansen (1991, 1995) multivariate
cointegration technique is used in this paper to test the existence of a long-run equilibrium
relationship among the variables specified in equation (1). A brief description of this
technique is presented below.
Let us consider the following VAR of order q:
yt = A1 yt −1 + A2 yt −2 + ⋅⋅⋅+ Aq yt − qt + wt

(2)

where yt is a k-vector of I(1) variables (e.g. in this study k=4), and wt is a vector of white
noise residuals. Following Johansen (1991, 1995), equation (2) can also be rewritten as:
q −1

∆yt = Π yt −1 + ∑ i =1 Γi ∆yt −i + ε t
q

(3)
q

where Π = ∑ i =1 Ai − I , and Γi = −∑ j =i +1 Aj
The rank (r) of Π determines the number of cointegrating vectors. If Π has a
reduced rank (i.e. r<k), then there exist k × r matrices α and β each with rank r, where
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Π = αβ ′ and β ′ yt is stationary. The elements of α represent the adjustment parameters

and each column of β in the literature is referred to as the cointegrating vector. Thus the
important issue is how to determine the number cointegrating vectors (or r). In this paper
both the trace statistics and the maximum eigenvalue statistics will determine r. The trace
statistics test the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the alternative of k
cointegrating equations. On the other hand, the maximum eigenvalue statistics test the null
of r cointegrating vectors versus the alternative of r+1 cointegrating relations. For more
details see Johansen (1991, 1995).
Let us assume that: a) all the variables in equation (1) are I(1); b) the resulting
residuals are I(0); and c) there is only one cointegrating vector in the system . According
to Engle and Granger (1987), it can then be stated that there exists a corresponding
error-correction mechanism (ECM) model of the following form:
∆ ln ( BE )t = γ 0 +

q1

i =0

q3

γ
∑
i =0

q2

∑ γ 1i ∆ ln( P / P* )t −i + ∑ γ 2i ∆ ln (Y )t −i +

3i

i =0

∆ ln ( Pm / P

)

*
m t −i

q4

(4)

+ ∑ δ i ∆ ln ( BE )t −i + θ ECM t −1 +ν t
i =1

where γji are the estimated short-term coefficients; θ represents the feedback effect or
the speed of adjustment whereby short-term dynamics converge to the long-term
equilibrium path indicated in equation (1); δi denotes for the estimated coefficients of
the lagged dependent variable to ensure that vt or the disturbance term is white noise;

ECM (the estimated et) is obtained from equation (1), and ∆ indicates the first-difference
operator.
The general-to-specific methodology can be used to omit insignificant variables
in equation (4) on the basis of a battery of maximum likelihood tests. In this method,
joint zero restrictions are imposed on explanatory variables in the unrestricted (general)
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model to obtain the most parsimonious and robust equation in the estimation process.

3. Empirical Results and Policy Implications
The sources of data for variables shown in equation (1) are Tabibian et al. (2000), the
Central Bank (2002, 2003) and the International Monetary Fund (2004) on-line IFS
database. An important step before using the Johansen multivariate technique is to
determine the time series properties of the data. This is an important issue since the use
of non-stationary data in the absence of cointegration can result in spurious regression
results. To this end, two unit root tests, i.e the ADF test, and the Kwiatskowski-PhillipsSchmidt-Shin (KPSS) test, have been adopted to examine the stationarity, or otherwise,
of the time series data. In this paper the lowest value of the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) has been used as a guide to determine the optimal lag length in the ADF
regression. These lags augment the ADF regression to ensure that the error term is white
noise and free of serial correlation. In addition to the ADF test, a KPSS test has been
performed for all the variables. Unlike the ADF test, the KPSS test has the null of
stationarity, and the alternative indicates the existence of a unit root.
Prior to undertaking an empirical investigation of the major long-run
determinants of the black market exchange rate, it is essential to determine the time
series properties of the data. In order to make robust conclusions about stationarity or
otherwise of the data, the ADF and the KPSS tests are utilised. The empirical results of
the ADF and KPSS tests are summarised in Table 1. According to the results of the
ADF and KPSS tests, all the four variables of ln(BE), ln(P/P*), ln(Y) and ln(Pm/P*m) are
I(1), indicating that they become stationary after first differencing.
[Table 1 about here]
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Since all the variables in equation (1) are I(1), the Johansen (1991, 1995)
multivariate cointegration technique can now be used to test the existence of a long-run
equilibrium relationship for BE. An unrestricted intercept and a linear trend in the
variables but not in the cointegrating vectors enter the system. The first important step in
this test is to determine the optimal lag length (q) in equation (3). Three lag selection
criteria of the AIC, the Final prediction error and the sequential modified LR (likelihood
ratio) test statistic have been employed to determine q. Based on these criteria (not
reported here but available from the author upon request), the optimal lag length is q=2.
Table 2 reports the results of the Johansen multivariate cointegration test on the
black market exchange rate as formulated in equation (1). According to both the trace and
max-eigenvalue tests there is robust evidence of one cointegrating vector at the 5 per
cent level. It should be noted that the eigenvalue associated with the first vector (0.54) is
considerably higher than those corresponding to the other vectors, thereby validating
that there exists a unique cointegrating vector in the system.
[Table 2 about here]
Given that there is only one cointegrating vector, one can also use the EngleGranger two step procedure to determine the long- and short-run factors affecting the
black market exchange rate.

Using the ordinary least square (OLS) method, the

estimated long-term model, equation (1), is presented below.

ln( BEt ) = 8.24 + 2.52 ln( Pt / Pt* ) − 0.39 ln(Yt ) − 1.03ln( Pmt / Pmt* )
t:

(7.3) (13.0)
2

R = 0.974

(-3.0)

(-6.5)

(5)

Residuals (ECM): I(0)

There are 43 annual observations in the sample period (1960-2002). As seen from the
above model, all the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 1
per cent level, and have the expected theoretical signs. This equation also performs
10

extremely well in terms of goodness-of-fit statistics. The adjusted R2 is as high as 0.974
and the overall F test rejects the null hypothesis at the one per cent level. Based on these
results, one can argue that in the long-term, one per cent increase in relative prices
(P/P*) can result in more than 2.5 per cent depreciation of the Iranian currency. In terms
of the magnitude of the estimated GDP elasticity, the above results indicate that if real
GDP increases say by 10 per cent, BE will appreciate by 3.9 per cent. It is also found
that an increase in the relative import prices by 1 per cent, ceteris paribus, could
strengthen the value of Iranian rial in the long-run by almost the same magnitude.
Since the estimated residuals from the long-term model are I(0), one can use the
Engle and Granger representation theorem (1987) to estimate the short-term model, or
equation (4). Table 3 presents the results for the vector error correction model, which
captures the short-term dynamics of the black market exchange rate. The general-tospecific methodology have been adopted in estimating equation (4) by omitting
insignificant lagged variables and undertaking a battery of maximum likelihood tests.
Joint zero restrictions have been imposed on insignificant explanatory variables in the
unrestricted (or general model) to obtain the most parsimonious and robust equation in
the estimation process. The parsimonious short-term model of exchange rate includes all
of the long-term determinants of the black market exchange rate except for ln(Pm/P*m) or
the relative import price indices.
In other words, the results reported in Table 3 indicate that the short-term
sources of the continuous depreciation of Iranian rial are massive domestic price rises in
Iran (compared to low rates of inflation in U.S) and the meager real growth of GDP. All
the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 8 per cent level and
have the expected signs. In terms of goodness-of-fit statistics, though expressed in
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∆ln(BE), with an R2 of 0.37, this equation performs reasonably well. This equation also
passes each and every diagnostic test. Table 3 also reveals that the feed-back coefficient
(or adjustment speed) is as high as –0.20 meaning that in every year 20 per cent of the
divergence between the short-term black market exchange-rate from its long-term path
is eliminated.
[Table 3 about here]
4. Concluding Remarks

In this paper the short-term and the long-term drivers of the black market exchange rate
in Iran have been examined by using annual time series data from 1960 to 2002. The
Johansen multivariate cointegration technique and the Engle-Granger two-step
procedure are employed to estimate and validate empirically the short- and long-term
exchange rate models.
The empirical results are broadly consistent with previous studies and the
monetary approach to the exchange-rate determination. It is found that in the long- and
short-term policies aimed at curbing the rate of inflation and stimulating the real growth
of GDP can restore and strengthen Iranian currency. It seems that relative import price
changes have not exerted a sizable and significant impact on the black market exchange
rate in the short run. In sum, if Iran is to continue financing her budget deficit through
monetisation, inflation can further depreciate the domestic currency on a one-to-one
basis. Therefore, given the magnitudes of the long-run elasticities for relative prices
(β1=2.52) and GDP (-0.39), curbing inflation should be the number one priority on the
policy agenda of the Iranian government and this cannot be achieved unless the central
bank of Iran operates independently.
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Table 1. ADF and KPSS Test Results
(including both constant and trend)
ADF test
KPSS
Variable
ADF
Optimum
Statistics
statistics
lag
ln(BE)
-2.12
0
0.174*
*
-5.17
0
0.110
∆ln(BE)
*
ln(P/P )
-1.69
2
0.217*
-4.15*
1
0.101
∆ln(P/P*)
Ln(Y)
-2.31
1
0.156*
-3.50*
0
0.107
∆ln(Y)
*
ln(Pm/P m)
-0.51
1
0.223*
-39.18
0
0.111
∆ln(Pm/P*m)
Note: * indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis
is rejected at the 5% significance level.

Table 2. Johansen Test for Cointegration
5%
Max.
5%
critical Eigenvalue critical
Eigenvalue
value
statistic
value
*
*
None
0.54
60.35
47.21
31.10
27.07
At most 1
0.36
29.25
29.68
18.07
20.97
At most 2
0.24
11.19
15.41
11.04
14.07
At most 3
0.00
0.15
3.76
0.15
3.76
*
Note: indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected at 5 %
significance level.
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s)

Trace
statistic
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Table 3. Results for the Short-Term Black Market Exchange Rate model, ∆ln(BEt)
Estimated
t-statistics*
Prob.
Expected signs
elasticities
Intercept
0.090
1.9
[0.06]
*
0.700
2.3
[0.03]
+
∆ln(P/P )t
-0.824
-2.1
[0.05]
∆ln(Yt-1)
ECMt-1
-0.196
-1.8
[0.08]
Order of integration of stochastic residuals: I(0)
Goodness-of-fit statistics:
R2=0.371
Overall F statistic F=(3,38) =7.5
Diagnostic tests:
DW
2.1
AR 1-2
F (2, 36) = 0.105
[0.90]
ARCH 1
F (1, 36) = 1.96
[0.17]
[0.53]
Normality
χ2 (2) = 1.26
White Heteroskedasticity
F (9, 28) = 1.93
[0.09]
RESET
F (1, 37) = 0.13
[0.71]
Notes: a) Figures in square brackets show the corresponding probabilities; b) the estimation
method is OLS, the sample period is from 1960 to 2002.
Independent Variables

Figure 1. The Relative Consumer Price Indices in Iran (P) and

the U.S (P*) and the Black Market Exchange Rate (BE), 1960-2003
Normalized 4
data
3

2

1

0

-1
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
P/P*

BE

Sources: Tabibian et al. (2000), the Central Bank (2002, 2003) and
the International Monetary Fund (2004) on-line IFS database.
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